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Abstract
This paper presents an instrumentation of a constructionist bottom-up approach to
coordination in multiagent systems. Coordination scenarios of autonomous agents
are modelled and formalised as a contraint optimisation problem. A distributed
asynchronous algorithm is presented that computes potential outcomes of coordi-
nation in these scenarios. Finally, it is shown how this algorithm can be integrated
into an operational coordination mechanism for a real-world domain.
1 Introduction
The ﬁeld of Multiagent Systems (MAS) is concerned with the study of systems
of multiple interacting artiﬁcial agents. Coordination provides the “control
structures” in such a system, so it does not surprise that it is one of the
major topics of MAS research. It is being tackled from diﬀerent points of
interest: besides Social Simulation [3] and Mechanism Design [8], the eﬃcient
construction of agent-based problem-solving systems is a primary objective. In
these systems, a single designer creates a purposefully designed architecture of
computational agents that interact in order to achieve jointly a desired global
functionality.
In this context, the traditional design philosophy is reductionism [6]. It
relies on a top-down decomposition of the global task, the assignment of sub-
tasks to agents and coordination based on pre-established interaction patterns
among benevolent agents. In these systems, agents have to account for interde-
pendencies between their local behaviours in the light of control uncertainty:
they have to ﬁnd coherent sets of local behaviours despite incomplete and po-
tentially inconsistent views of the overall problem-solving state. Coordination
problems of these characteristics have often been formalised as distributed
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search in the agent behaviour space [2]. A popular model for the instru-
mentation of coordination is distributed constraint satisfaction [10], [11]: the
interdependencies between agent behaviours are modelled as constraints, and
the messages exchanged among agents are conceived as the messages of a
distributed constraint satisfaction algorithm.
However, reductionist approaches to coordination in multiagent problem
solving systems often turn out to be too rigid for real-world applications [6].
Instead, a constructionist approach, based on the metaphor of societies of
autonomous problem-solving agents, has become popular: agents are primar-
ily interested in their local goals and interact to increase the degree of their
attainment. In order that the system copes with the global task, a construc-
tionist approach to coordination must be based on a mechanism that biases
agent behaviour in a desired direction, i.e. somewhere between benevolence
and self-interest. Elsewhere [7], we described the fundamentals of structural
cooperation, an example of a coordination mechanism of this type.
In this paper, we present an algorithm for the instrumentation of struc-
tural cooperation based on distributed constraint-based search and illustrate
its application to a particular domain. Section 2 characterises the coordina-
tion scenarios that we are interested in. In Section 3, we present a distributed
constraint optimisation algorithm, that computes potential outcomes of coor-
dination in these scenarios. In Section 4 we point to a real-world application
of this coordination approach, before presenting our conclusions in Section 5.
2 The problem
We ﬁrst provide a formal description of the type of multiagent domains that
our coordination scenarios are based on: systems of cognitive agents that
reactively develop short-term plans. Elsewhere [1], we have argued that such
a stance is appropriate for a variety of real world scenarios, such as many
decisions support domains. Section 2.2 gives a simpliﬁed example of one of
the targeted domains.
2.1 The coordination setting
Let S be a set of world states and Π a ﬁnite set of plans. The execution of a
plan π changes the state of the world, which is modelled as a partially deﬁned
mapping
res : Π× S → S
A plan π is executable in s, if only if res is deﬁned for a certain world
state s. We express this formally by means of the predicate exec(π, s). There
is a set of agents A, each of which can act in the world thereby modifying its
state.
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Definition 2.1 An agent α ∈ A is characterised by the following notions: 2
• a preference relation α over world states;
• a set of legally enactable individual plans Πsα ⊆ Π, where res(π, s) is deﬁned
for all π ∈ Πsα. 3
Legally enactable individual plans represent an agent α’s action alterna-
tives, while the preference relation α expresses α’s desires respecting world
states to bring about.
We now introduce a notion of simultaneous and interdependent action.
The set M of multiplans comprises all multisets over the individual plans Π,
i.e. M = bagof(Π). A multiplan µ ∈M models the simultaneous execution of
all its component plans, i.e. of the individual plans π ∈ µ that are contained
in the multiset µ. The commutative operator ◦ denotes multiset union and
hence states that its operands are to be executed together. 4
By identifying an individual plan with a multiplan that contains it as its
only element, the partial function res is extended to multiplans:
res : M × S → S
The function res is undeﬁned for a multiplan µ and a state s, if some of
the individual plans that it contains are incompatible, i.e. in case that in a
state s of a modelled domain it is impossible to execute them simultaneously.
Otherwise, µ is said to be executable in s (formally: exec(µ, s)).
We deﬁne the set of groups Γ as the powerset of the set of agents, i.e.
Γ = ℘ (A). An assignment is a bijective function Ψ that maps each group
member α ∈ γ to exactly one of the individual plans π ∈ µ in a multiplan µ.
Note that an assignment always relates n agents to a multiplan µ comprising
n individual plans, even though µ contains some individual plans more than
once.
We can then extend the notion of legally enactable plans to groups:
Definition 2.2 The set of legally enactable multiplans M sγ ⊆ M contains all
µ ∈M such that
• res(µ, s) is deﬁned, i.e. µ is executable;
2 The deﬁnitions given in this section are expressed with respect to a state s. For the
purpose of illustrating the coordination algorithm to be presented in Section 3, we can
assume s to be a ﬁxed “current” state.
3 The mechanism of structural cooperation actually requires that a legally enactable plan
π of agent α be executable in a state s (exec(π, s)), that α be capable of enacting π
(can(α, π)), and that it not be prohibited for α to execute π (¬forbiddens(α, π)). The set
may change with s, either because the new situation modiﬁed the executability of some
plan, or because the system designer chose to modify the prohibitions respecting some π.
However, as indicated above, for the sake of this paper the “higher level” notion of legally
enactable plans in a current state s is suﬃcient.
4 In the sequel we will use a set of cardinality one and its only element indiscriminately.
So, for instance, we write and µ = π′ ◦ π = π ◦ π′ = {π, π′} and µ ◦ π = π ◦ µ = {π, π, π′}
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• there is an assignment Ψ such that ∀α ∈ γ.Ψ(α) ∈ Πsα. 5
The coordination settings that we are interested in are determined by the
sets of individuals S, Π, A and the function res, as well as for each agent α
the predicate α and the set Πsα. We are particularly interested in a speciﬁc
kind of coordination settings: a coordination setting is detached, if an agent’s
acquaintances may inﬂuence the executability of its individual plans (the truth
value of the predicate exec), but not its preference respecting their outcome
(the state resulting from the function res).
Definition 2.3 A coordination setting is detached, if for all agents α ∈ A
and all groups γ ∈ Γ, α ∈ γ holds: if π ∈ Πsα is a legally enactable plan of α,
µ ∈M is a multiplan, and (π ◦ µ) ∈M sγ is legally enactable by γ, then
res (π, s) ∼α res (π ◦ µ, s)
Finally, let us have a short look at potential outcomes of a coordination
process in such a scenario. Obviously, this outcome determines the individual
plans that every agent chooses to enact, and can thus be modelled as a multi-
plan. Given the fact that we are interested in coordination among autonomous
(self-interested) agents, several requirement for the coordination process and
its outcome can be postulated.
Firstly, a solution needs to be individually rational : the agents will con-
verge on an agreement if they are better oﬀ coordinating with their acquain-
tances than individually. Still, in almost every interesting multiagent domain
this is the case. 6
More important, the coordination outcome is to be “eﬃcient”. Let µ and
µ′ be two legally enactable multiplans. We say that µ dominates µ′ if the result
of executing µ is weakly preferred by all agents to the result of executing µ.
This is
∀α ∈ A. res (µ′, s) α res (µ, s)
A legally enactable multiplan µ is Pareto-optimal, if it is undominated by
any other legally enactable multiplan. This is to say that in all other legally
enactable multiplans µ′, there is at least one agent α that strongly prefers the
result of µ to the outcome of µ′.
Definition 2.4 A legally enactable multiplan µ ∈M sγ is Pareto-optimal if
∀µ′ ∈M sA, µ′ = µ,∃α ∈ A. res (µ′, s) ≺α res (µ, s)
5 Structural cooperation does not actually require res(π, s) to be deﬁned for all π ∈ µ. So,
it considers the case that a certain π may not be executable alone, but that other plans
π′ ∈ µ contain actions that ﬁll the “gap” in π and thus make it executable as part of the
multiplan µ. However, throughout this paper, we stick to the stronger assumption that all
π ∈ µ of a legally enactable multiplan µ also have to be legally enactable.
6 One of the few exceptions are two-player zero-sum games, where the agents’ interests are
totally antagonistic.
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Fig. 1. Distributed Traﬃc Management Scenario
Pareto-optimality assures that no option to improve (or at least: not to
deteriorate) an agreement in the eyes of all agents is wasted. This is partic-
ularly relevant for multiagent problem-solving systems, where we can assume
that the local preference relations of the agents correlate positively with the
desired global functionality of the system. Still, there are usually several
Pareto-optimal multiplans. It is the particular coordination mechanism that
establishes how to choose among them.
2.2 An Example: the traﬃc management domain
As an example of the coordination settings that we are targeting, consider a
system in charge of managing urban road traﬃc, so as to maintain and restore
the “smooth” ﬂow of vehicles. Such a system receives information about the
current traﬃc state (usually by means of “loop detectors” installed under the
road surface), and generates signal plans to inﬂuence traﬃc ﬂows and alleviate
problems. Signal plans determine the state of traﬃc control devices, such as
the messages to be shown on Variable Message Signals (VMS) installed above
the road, or cycle times of traﬃc lights at junctions.
A distributed approach to the design of such traﬃc management systems
has many advantages [1]. Setting out from the traﬃc engineers’ knowledge
respecting the usefulness of a logical subdivision of the road network into
problem areas, we can build a distributed system that relies on a set of au-
tonomous traﬃc control agents, each responsible for the traﬃc management
in one such areas (see Figure 1). Once an agent detects traﬃc problems in its
area, it generates a set of alternative local signal plans to overcome them, and
ranks them according to their estimated eﬀectivity with respect to its local
traﬃc problems. Still, local signal plans are interdependent: they may either
be incompatible and use the same control device in incompatible ways (e.g.
display diﬀerent messages on the same VMS), or they may be interfering,
changing traﬃc ﬂows not only in their local but also in neighbouring areas
(thus modifying the eﬀectivity of other agents’ plans) [4].
The problem of coordinating these agents can be modelled in the above
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terms:
• the alternative signal plans for a traﬃc agent’s problem area correspond to
the set of legally enactable individual plans.
• the ranking of an agent α’s alternative signal plans corresponds to the local
preference relation α on the resulting world states
• the simultaneous execution of the agents’ local signal plans corresponds to a
multiplan. Incompatibility of local signal plans means that the correspond-
ing multiplan is not legally enactable. Interference is modelled by the fact
that the result of an individual plan π changes when enacted within the
multiplan µ.
Consider, for instance, the following situation, where 3 traﬃc agents α1,
α2 and α3 each generate 3 alternative signal plans with the following local
preferences over them:
Πsα1 = {πa1 , πa2 , πa3} with πa1 1 πa2 1 πa3 ,
Πsα2 = {πb1 , πb2 , πb3} with πb1 2 πb2 2 πb3 ,
Πsα3 = {πc1 , πc2 , πc3} with πc1 3 πc2 3 πc3 .
In our example, suppose that the following sets of individual plans are
incompatible, i.e. do not constitute a legally enactable multiplan for the group
{α1, α2, α3}:
{πa1 , πb1 , πc1}, {πa1 , πb1 , πc2}, {πa1 , πb2 , πc1}, {πa1 , πb2 , πc2}, {πa2 , πb1 , πc1},
{πa2 , πb2 , πc1}, {πa1 , πb1 , πc3}, {πa1 , πb3 , πc1}, {πa3 , πb1 , πc1}, {πa2 , πb3 , πc1}
If the subdivision of the road network is deﬁned in such a way that the
possible variation of ﬂows between problem areas is negligible, the coordina-
tion setting is detached : agents only compete for the use of control devices,
but their preference over their local signal plans is not aﬀected by the choices
of others. In our example we adopt this assumption. So, for instance, agent
α1 is indiﬀerent respecting the following multiplans:
{πa1 , πb2 , πc3} ∼1 {πa1 , πb3 , πc2} ∼1 {πa1 , πb3 , πc3}
In such a setting, it can be easily checked that there is a total of 4 Pareto-
optimal legally enactable multiplans:
µ1 = {πa1 , πb2 , πc3}; µ2 = {πa1 , πb3 , πc2}; µ3 = {πa2 , πb1 , πc2} and
µ4 = {πa3 , πb2 , πc1}.
3 Distributed Search for Pareto-optimality
In this section we describe our distributed algorithm for computing undomi-
nated (i.e. Pareto-optimal) legally enactable multiplans in the aforementioned
coordination scenario. After relating the coordination scenario to constraint
optimisation, Section 3.2 describes the algorithm in further detail and illus-
trates its dynamics. An analysis of the algorithm is given in Section 3.3.
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3.1 Coordination as constraint optimisation
In this section we model our coordination scenario as a constraint optimisation
problem (COP). In COPs each agent has control over a decision variable to
which it can assign values from its local domain. Constraints involve two or
more agents’ variables, determining whether sets of assignments of values to
the agents’ variables are consistent or inconsistent. In addition, there is a
preference ordering over value assignments. We call a set of value assignments
consistent, if it complies with all constraints. It is a solution, if it is consistent
and also “optimal” with respect to the preference ordering.
Our original problem of ﬁnding legally enactable, undominated multiplans
in a coordination setting can be mapped onto such a distributed constraint
optimisation problem without major problems.
• An agent’s decision variable corresponds to the choice of the legally en-
actable individual plans π that it is going to enact; its local domain is given
by the set Πsα.
• The constraints between variables are implied by multiplan executability.
Consistent sets of value assignments are a synonym for legally enactable
multiplans.
• Setting out from the subsequent notion of local preference α for each
agent α, the preference ordering over legally enactable multiplans is given
by multiplan domination.
So, a solution to our constraint optimisation problem (i.e. an “optimal”
value assignment) corresponds to a Pareto-optimal legally enactable multi-
plan. In order to contribute to a solution of coordination scenarios modelled
as COPs of these characteristics, each agent α needs to be endowed with the
following knowledge:
• its legally enactable individual plans π ∈ Πsα ;
• the way that legally enactable multiplans µ of its acquaintances may inﬂu-
ence its individual plans π ∈ Πsα, respecting their executability in a situation
s (exec(π ◦ µ, s)) as well as respecting their outcome (res(π ◦ µ, s));
• its local preference α on world states.
We aim at designing an algorithm that determines possible outcomes of
our coordination scenario (Pareto-optimal legally enactable multiplans) by
computing solutions to the corresponding COP.
3.2 The Algorithm
In decentralised MAS, coordination should rely on a decentralised mecha-
nism. So, we are interested in an asynchronous, distributed algorithm for
computing solutions to the above COP. Such algorithms are diﬀerent from
parallel/distributed methods for constraint satisfaction, in that there is an a
priori distribution of problem knowledge among asynchronously acting agents,
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while the latter aim to design a distributed architecture in order to generate
solutions more eﬃciently through parallelism [12].
Our particular approach to the computation of such solutions is based on
asynchronous weak commitment search: a dependency-directed backtracking
algorithm adapted to distributed constraint satisfaction problems [11]. We
have extended this algorithm to cope with the speciﬁc characteristics of our
constraint optimisation scenario.
In the following we ﬁrst give a short overview of the fundamentals of our
algorithm. Subsequently, we describe the information models that each agent
maintains during the distributed search process. After having a closer look at
the notion of local consistency and examining the message types used in our
distributed algorithm, we ﬁnally present our agent programs that lead to an
asynchronous and distributed computation of the set of undominated legally
enactable multiplans.
3.2.1 Overview
The algorithm assumes that each agent follows the same simple agent pro-
gram: in every instant of time, an agent chooses from its legally enactable
individual plans the one that results in a current multiplan that is “locally
consistent” and most preferred by it. The agents’ attempts to achieve local
consistency produce a chain reaction, which eventually leads to a stable state.
The deﬁnition of local consistency in conjunction with this local choice strat-
egy assures that in stable states, when all agents are waiting for messages,
their choices of individual plans constitute a legally enactable and hopefully
undominated multiplan.
A major diﬃculty in an asynchronously acting agent system is to avoid
cycles, i.e. to prevent inﬁnite processing. This is achieved by dynamically
generating nogoods. Nogoods are multiplans that cannot be extended to a
legally enactable multiplan involving all agents. As such, they describe new,
dynamic constraints: all multiplans that constitute a superset of a nogood are
not legally enactable.
We are interested in the potential of ﬁnding all undominated legally en-
actable multiplans. Therefore, once a solution has been found, the search
process must be restarted until no further solutions are present. For this
purpose, previously found solutions are recorded as another type of dynamic
constraint. These solution constraints assure that the same legally enactable
solutions cannot be encountered twice. In the sequel, we describe the key
aspects of the agents programs.
3.2.2 Information models and local consistency
The program of an agent α requires that certain dynamic information involving
α be available in a so-called self model:
• its current value, i.e. a tentative legally enactable individual plan π ∈ Πsα ;
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• its current authority level vα ∈ ℵ (see below);
• the set Ξ of previously generated nogoods χ that α is involved in
• the set R of previously found solutions ρ that α is involved in
In addition, the following information about other agents is maintained in
speciﬁc acquaintance models. For each agent α˜ that α shares some constraint
with such a model keeps track of
• α˜’s current value, i.e. a tentative legally enactable individual plan π ∈ Πsα˜ ;
• α˜’s current authority level vα˜ ∈ ℵ .
By joining the information on the current value from the self model and
all acquaintance models, an agent has information respecting the current mul-
tiplan µ.
Local consistency is deﬁned with relation to an agent’s authority level, a
unique integer value for each agent that deﬁnes a total order among them.
An individual plan of an agent α is locally consistent, if it is part of a current
multiplan that fulﬁls all constraints involving only higher authority agents.
Definition 3.1 Let π ∈ Πsα and µ ∈ M sγ where γ contains all agents with
higher authority than α. Agent α’s plan π is locally consistent, if the current
multiplan π ◦ µ obeys the following conditions:
• it complies with all genuine constraints;
• it is not a superset of a nogood;
• it is does not coincide with a solution.
A locally consistent value is called an option of the agent. As we will argue
later, the authority levels do not aﬀect the result of the distributed search
process, but inﬂuence the order in which undominated and legally enactable
multiplans are found. They are not part of the coordination setting, but a
technical means used by the distributed algorithm to compute Pareto-optimal
plans within the setting.
3.2.3 Information models and messages
In order to keep their information models up-to-date, agents exchange messages. 7
These are the essential messages and their “semantics”: 8
• value messages: the sender informs the receiver that its current value has
changed.
• nogood messages: the sender informs the receiver that it has detected a
nogood.
7 We assume a communication model with ﬁnite but random delay in message delivery,
whereas messages are received in the order in which they are sent.
8 There are some additional “control” messages. For instance, timeout messages abort the
algorithm immediately, by requiring agents to enter directly into a locally consistent state.
By means of this, we can make use of the anytime properties of the algorithm [7].
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• authority messages: the sender informs the receiver that its current author-
ity level has changed.
• solution messages: the sender informs the receiver that it has detected a
solution.
Upon the reception of these messages, the receivers update their self or
acquaintance models accordingly. If a corresponding acquaintance model does
not yet exist, it is created.
Once an agent updates its information models as a result of the choices
implied by its agent program (see next section), relevant acquaintances are
informed through messages. If an agent updates its own current individual
plan (or: its own authority level), value (or: authority) messages are sent to
all agents that it shares some constraints with. In case that a nogood has been
detected, all agents that may be involved in it will receive nogood messages.
Solution messages are targeted to all agents.
3.2.4 Agent programs
We are now provided with all ingredients to describe the dynamics of agent
programs. The agent that ﬁrst detects a new situation s initiates the dis-
tributed algorithm. This leader agent plays a special role 9 : It is in charge of
detecting solutions, as well as of collecting the corresponding legally enactable
multiplans. Apart from that, it behaves like all other agents.
Once an agent α receives a message from an acquaintance, it updates its in-
formation models accordingly and calculates its options, i.e. the set of legally
enactable individual plans that are locally consistent with respect to its in-
formation models. Subsequently, if it detects to be in a locally inconsistent
state, it behaves according to the following local choice strategy.
METHOD localChoice (Options)
IF Options = ∅ THEN
Nogoods←calcNewNogoods()
FOR EACH µ ∈Nogoods DO
updateModels(nogood, µ)
v′ ←determineAuthority()
IF selfModel.authority = v′ THEN
updateModels(authority, v′)
NewOptions←calcNewOptions(v′)
localChoice(NewOptions)
ELSE // Options = ∅
π′ ← max
4α
{π ∈ Options}
updateModels(value, π′)
9 Note that every agent can initiate the interaction process, i.e. every agent can play the
role of the leader.
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END METHOD
Given the example 3-agent coordination setting from Section 2, suppose
that α1 has the highest authority level, followed by α2 and α3. Furthermore,
assume that α2’s current value is πb1 , and that α3’s current value is πc1 . Now,
both agents receive value messages from α1, the leader, indicating that its
current value has changed to πa1 .
Upon reception of the value messages, α2 and α3 update their acquaintance
models of α1 accordingly. As it only needs to take into account constraints
with α1, agent α2 remains in a locally consistent state and does not react.
Still, α3’s current value is not locally consistent. Moreover, its set of options
is also empty (there is no way to build a locally consistent multiplan with the
current values of α1 and α2): asynchronous search has come to a dead-end and
backtracking needs to be done. For each subset of the current multiplan that
makes it impossible to restore local consistency, i.e. for each combination of
values of higher authority agents that leaves no options to the agent, a nogood
is generated and models are updated accordingly. In our example, α3 computes
the nogood {πa1 , πb1}, and sends the corresponding nogood -messages to α1
and α2 (the agents involved in the nogood). Suppose that determineAuthority
settles a kind of distributed search that does not require a change of authority
of α3 at this time
10 .
Upon reception of the nogood messages, α1 and α2 update their self models.
α1 remains locally consistent, as it is not the lowest authority agent involved
in the nogood {πa1 , πb1}. Still, α2 is, and so it calculates its set of options in
order to restore its local consistency. Option comprise πb2 and πb3 , and the
locally most preferred πb2 is chosen. α2 updates its self model accordingly,
and all related agents are informed about the value change. In the example,
value messages are sent to α1 and α3.
Upon reception of the value messages, α1 and α3 update their acquaintance
models of α2. Again, α1 is still locally consistent, but α3 needs to calculate
its set of options, which is now limited to only πc3 . The self model is updated
and the corresponding value messages are sent to α1 and α2. When agents α1
and α2 receive these messages, they update their acquaintance models of α3
accordingly, but both remain in a locally consistent state.
Now, the leader agent α1 detects that all agents are in a stable, locally
consistent state 11 . By consequence, a solution has been found and the leader
10
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sends solution messages to all acquaintances. Upon the reception of these
messages, agents store the solution in their self models. In the example, agent
α2 and α3 record the Pareto-optimal multiplan {πa1 , πb2 , πc3} as a new solution
constraint.
Still, due this new constraint agent α3 has come into a locally inconsistent
state. So, the distributed search process recommences, but with a search
space of reduced size. The algorithm concludes when no more legally enactable
multiplans can be found. This is detected when an empty nogood is generated
and the method updateModels tries to store it in the self model.
3.3 Analysis
The above algorithm has been designed to compute potential outcomes of
coordination in decentralised multiagent problem-solving systems. This type
of systems is usually applied to domains that show an a priori distribution:
the subdivision of the problem-solving system into diﬀerent agents and the
corresponding agent processes is rather the result of a given problem structure
(spatial distribution, access restrictions etc. [7]), than a means to attack
computational complexity issues. Upon this background, in this section we
analyse some of the properties of the aforementioned algorithm.
The diﬀerent agent processes perform parallel, asynchronous computation:
nogood messages only imply the reaction of one agent (the one with the lowest
authority level in the nogood), but messages informing about value changes
cause simultaneous activity. The communication load is limited by selective
addressing. Note that when acquaintances are informed about new nogoods,
it would suﬃce to direct the corresponding messages just to the lowest au-
thority agent involved in the nogood. Still, authority levels are changing and
our policy of routing nogood messages anticipates potential future communi-
cation. Furthermore, the search space is pruned on the basis of nogoods, as
all multiplans that comprise a nogood are not explored.
Respecting soundness and completeness of the algorithm, we have obtained
the following results.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose a coordination setting, where all agents apply the agent
program. The following holds: after ﬁnite time the algorithm terminates and
the leader is endowed with a superset of all undominated, legally enactable
multiplans.
Corollary 3.3 In a detached coordination setting, the leader hosts precisely
the set of undominated, legally enactable multiplans.
Proofs can be found in [7]. Another interesting question concerns the
complexity of the distributed algorithm. As the whole search space needs to be
the leader with such a snapshot. Details on this solution detection method can be found in
[7].
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traversed in order to guarantee completeness, the algorithm’s time complexity
is exponential in the number of agents in the worst case. This is underlined by
the NP-completeness of the constraint problems, that the problem of ﬁnding
legally enactable multiplans has been mapped onto. 12
The worst case space complexity for each agent is determined by the num-
ber of recorded nogoods. So, it may also grow exponentially in the number of
agents. This seems inevitable as both completeness and a dynamic traversal
of the space of multiplans have to be assured.
Still, despite these “unpleasant” complexity results, the algorithm is ef-
fectively applicable to coordination scenarios with relatively few agents and
small sets of legally enactable individual plans.
4 An Application
In this section we outline how the above algorithm can be applied to a real-
world problem. It is part of the instrumentation of the coordination mech-
anism called structural cooperation, which as been used in the TRYSA2 proto-
type (TRYS Autonomous Agents) for urban traﬃc management [7][4]. TRYSA2
consists of 11 autonomous knowledge-based traﬃc control agents, that jointly
manage a road network consisting of one ring-road and seven adjacent mo-
torways, provided with over 300 loop detectors, 52 Variable Message Signals
(VMS), 3 traﬃc lights for junction control, as well as ramp metering on 7
ring-road drives.
Agents are provided with knowledge about the dynamics of traﬃc ﬂows in
their particular problem area and use advanced reasoning techniques to come
up with alternative local signal plans to overcome them. Once a traﬃc problem
is detected by an agent, it determines its magnitude in terms of the amount of
traﬃc demand that exceeds the capacity of the area’s road segments. In much
the same way, alternative signal plans are ranked by their expected reduction in
traﬃc excess, i.e. a signal plan is the more preferred that more it is supposed
to reduce traﬃc excess in the problem area. We call the expected reduction
of traﬃc excess by a signal plan its local utility for the corresponding traﬃc
agent.
The mechanism of structural cooperation makes use of this additional in-
formation on plan utility when determining the outcome of coordination.
Firstly, it allows the agents to agree on a gamble respecting which mul-
tiplan to enact: they may toss a coin and, according to the outcome of this
experiment, execute one or another multiplan. This gamble is referred to as
mixed multiplan. The utility of a mixed multiplan is the weighed sum of the
utilities of the (pure) multiplans that it comprises. Second, besides individual
rationality and Pareto-optimality, structural cooperation requires a coordina-
12Given these ﬁndings, in some settings it will be necessary to rely on the anytime properties
of the algorithm (or to limit in advance the number of solutions to be searched for).
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tion outcome to be symmetric (no agent has an a priori advantage), invariant
under certain types of linear transformations of the utility function, and in-
dependent of irrelevant alternatives (additional “bad” plans of an agent do
not inﬂuence the outcome of coordination). Under these conditions, it has
been shown that autonomous (self-interested) agents will agree on the mixed
multiplan, that maximises the product of gains for each agent, compared to
the situation of disagreement where every agent tries to cope with its local
problems without taking into account its acquaintances. This is called the
Nash bargaining solution [9].
The above ﬁnding is particularly interesting, because it allows us to com-
pute the outcome of the coordination process of autonomous agents by means
of an algorithm in which agents behave benevolently. In particular, the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives assures that agents only gamble on Pareto-
optimal plans. This allows for the integration of the distributed algorithm
described in Section 3 into the multistage coordination algorithm of TRYSA2.
As Figure 2 depicts, according to this algorithm the coordination process is a
sequence of three stages.
• Stage 1: asynchronous search for Pareto-optimality
the asynchronous distributed constraint optimisation algorithm of Section
3 determines undominated, legally enactable multiplans
• Stage 2: determination of the Nash bargaining solution
the agent that detects the termination of Stage 1 plays the role of the
leader in this stage. On the basis of the result of Stage 1, it computes the
(approximate) product-maximising solution in mixed multiplans.
• Stage 3: probabilistic assignment of individual plans
the leading agent generates a lottery in accordance with the outcome of
Stage 2, and urges its acquaintances to execute the corresponding individual
plans (i.e. local signal plans) accordingly.
The TRYSA2 system has been implemented experimentally on networked
workstations. The TRYSA agents constitute separate Prolog processes (with
some extensions in C++), which communicate via sockets. The road network
is simulated by a traﬃc simulator that performs microscopic (“car by car”)
simulation of traﬃc ﬂows. A special observer agent has been implemented in
Tcl/Tk in order to visualise the problem-solving process and its results [7].
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how a coordination scenario of multiple au-
tonomous problem-solving agents can be modelled as a constraint optimisa-
tion problem. We have presented and analysed a distributed asynchronous
constraint optimisation algorithm to compute the Pareto-optimal solutions
of the corresponding coordination scenario. Finally, we have used the traf-
ﬁc management domain to illustrate the instrumentation of a coordination
14
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Fig. 2. Multistage coordination algorithm
mechanism based on this algorithm.
We plan to evaluate the mechanism of structural cooperation, as well as
the algorithm that instruments it, in other domains. We are particularly
interested in a comparison to centralised solutions, as realised in [5] for the
traﬃc domain. In addition we are working towards a tighter integration of
the Stages 1 and 2 of our coordination algorithm in order to improve its
computational complexity.
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